developed an algorithm combining variance reduction techniques with value iteration to solve discounted Markov decision processes. This algorithm has a sublinear complexity when the discount factor is fixed. Here, we extend this approach to meanpayoff problems, including both Markov decision processes and perfect information zero-sum stochastic games. We obtain sublinear complexity bounds, assuming there is a distinguished state which is accessible from all initial states and for all policies. Our method is based on a reduction from the mean payoff problem to the discounted problem by a Doob h-transform, combined with a deflation technique. The complexity analysis of this algorithm uses at the same time the techniques developed by Sidford et al. in the discounted case and non-linear spectral theory techniques (Collatz-Wielandt characterization of the eigenvalue).
I. INTRODUCTION
Context. Markov decision processes, and more generally zero-sum two player stochastic games, are classical models to study sequential problems under uncertainty [1, 2] . They appear in various applications ranging from engineering sciences, finance, economy, to health care or ecology. The dynamic programming method allows one to reduce the infinite horizon problem, in which players optimize a discounted payoff, to a fixed point problem, involving an order preserving and contracting map, called Bellman or Shapley operator. Value iteration and policy iteration [1] are two fundamental dynamic programming methods. The execution time of these two algorithms is generally super-linear in the size of the input, and it is desirable to develop accelerated algorithms, for well structured huge scale instances.
Algorithms based on Monte-Carlo simulations can lead to improved scalability. In a recent progress, Sidford et al. [3] combined value iteration algorithm with sampling and variance reduction techniques. They obtained an algorithm for discounted infinite-horizon MDPs that, remarkably, is sublinear in a certain relevant regime of the parameters.
In the mean payoff problem, the discount factor tends to 1 and the bounds of execution time for value iteration blow up which excludes to pass to the limit in the algorithm of [3] .
Contribution. In the present paper, we study a class of two-player mean payoff problems, and we still obtain a sublinear complexity result. This applies in particular to the mean payoff problems for MDPs, which correspond to the special one-player case.
To do so, we exploit a general method, first introduced in a previous work of two of the authors [4] , allowing one to reduce a class of mean payoff problems to discounted problems. In this way, complexity results concerning the discounted problem can be transferred (with some additional work) to the mean payoff case.
This reduction combines a scaling argument (a combinatorial version of Doob's h-transform arising in the boundary theory of Markov processes [5] ) and a deflation technique: to a mean payoff problem, we associate a discounted problem, with a state-dependent discount rate (Thm. 4). Another key idea is the use of weighted sup-norms, in order to obtain contraction rates for this new Shapley operator. Then, we solve the mean payoff problem by calling twice a variant of the algorithm of Sidford's et al. [3] : we call first this variant to compute the diagonal scaling involved in our reduction, and then to solve the discounted game obtained after the reduction. We also note that the present variant includes an extension of the algorithm of [3] for one player to the twoplayer case, this is an easier matter-the main novelty here is rather the reduction from the mean payoff problem to value iteration in the discounted case.
The subclass of problems to which our method applies requires the existence of a distinguished state c to which all other states have access, for all policies of the two players. The maximum of the hitting time of this state, for all policies, appears in our complexity bound. There are instances in which this maximal hitting time is O(1), and then we end up with a sublinear regime.
Weighted sup-norms were already used by Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis to obtain contraction results for value iteration in the case of stochastic shortest path problems [6] . Our main results include Thm. 1 and Cor. 1, which characterize the best contraction rate, with respect to all possible weighted sup-norms, as the Collatz-Wielandt number of a certain convex monotone positively homogeneous map which we call the "Clarke recession function". This also implies that a contraction estimate previously computed in [4] is indeed optimal, if all the actions are "useful" in a natural sense.
Comparison with other approaches. Gupta, Jain and
Glynn have recently developed a Monte-Carlo version of relative value iteration to solve mean payoff problems [7] . The convergence analysis requires the Bellman operator to be a strict contraction in the "span seminorm". This is a demanding condition. For instance, in the 0-player case, this requires the transition matrix to be primitive, where our reduction holds in more general circumstances (the uniqueness of the final class suffices). Wang developed in [8] an algorithm for mean-payoff MDPs (one player), that has a sublinear bound. This algorithm depends on a mixing time and on a parameter τ measuring the distance between the invariant measures attached to different policies (the mixing times of [8] should not be confused with the hitting times used here, the finiteness of the former implies the finiteness of the latter, but not vice versa). There are instances in which the distance τ is exponential in the input size, whereas the hitting time is linear. The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we recall basic notions about zero-sum games. In Section III, we present the main techniques allowing the reduction from the mean payoff case to the discounted case. In Section IV, we present an adaptation of the variance reduction algorithm of [3] , allowing us to handle the operators obtained after the deflation and h-transform reduction. In Section V, we derive the sublinear bounds for classes of mean payoff problems. Examples are presented in Section VI. Most proofs are omitted owing to the space constraint.
II. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING OPERATORS

A. Shapley operators of perfect information zero-sum stochastic games with general discount factor
We refer the reader to [2] for background on stochastic games. We next briefly recall the main notions and properties.
A perfect information two-player zero-sum stochastic game with general discount (SG) is described by the following data. We consider a finite state space S := {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ S, A i is a finite set representing the possible actions of player MIN in state i, and B i,a is a finite set representing the possible actions of player MAX in state i, when player MIN just played action a. We denote by is an element of ∆(S) the set of probability measures on S; we shall identify P ab i to a row vector in R n , writing P ab i = (P ab ij ) j∈S where P ab ij is the transition probability to the next state j, given the current state i and the actions taken a ∈ A i , b ∈ B i,a . For all (i, a, b) ∈ E, r ab i is a reward (real number) that MIN pays to MAX, and γ ab i (real nonnegative number) is a discount factor. We define
where R + := {x ∈ R | x 0}. We allow γ ab i to take values larger than 1. The term turn-based is sometimes used as a synonym of "perfect information". This is in contrast with the more general model of Shapley's imperfect information stochastic games in which two players play simultaneously with randomized actions, see e.g. [9] .
Recall that a strategy of a player is a decision rule which associates to a history of the game an admissible action of this player. A strategy σ of player Min, a strategy τ of player Max, and an initial state i, alltogether determine a random process (i , a , b ) 0 with values in E: i represents the state at step , and a , b represent the actions of the two players at the same state. We require that i 0 = i. We denote by E i,σ,τ the expectation with respect to the probability measure governing this process. Given a finite horizon k, we consider the zero-sum game in which the payoff of player Max is given by
The value v k i of the k-stage game starting from i is defined as
where the infima and suprema are taken over the set of strategies of both players. By definition, the existence of the value requires the infimum and the supremum to commute. A pair of strategies σ * , τ * is said to be optimal if σ * achieves the first infimum in (2) and if τ * achieves the second supremum in (2) . For all (i, a, b) ∈ E, we set M ab ij := γ ab i P ab ij and M ab i := (M ab ij ) j∈S ∈ R n . Definition 1. For a given SG, the Shapley operator T is the map R n → R n whose ith coordinate is given by
It is known that the value vector v k = (v k i ) i∈S does exist and satisfies
Relations of this form are often established when the discount factor is constant [2] , they remain valid for general functionals of the form (1) with state and action dependent factors, see Chapter 11 of [10] . Note that the assumption that the discount factor be smaller than 1 is not needed for the well posedness of the finite horizon problem and for the validity of (3). Similarly, one can consider the infinite horizon discounted zero-sum game, in which the payoff of player Max is now
This payment is well defined, in particular, when, Γ < 1 since then the above series become absolutely convergent. Then, the value of the infinite horizon game and the notion of optimal strategies are defined in a similar manner to the finite horizon case. The value vector v = (v i ) i∈S does exist and it is characterized as the unique solution of the fixed point problem v = T (v) , see again [2] for background. We shall see later on that the assumption Γ < 1 can be relaxed: what matters is that the discount factor be smaller than one in an "average" sense.
In what follows, it will be convenient to consider a special class of strategies, determined by policies (feedback, stationary rules). A policy of player MIN is a map:
We denote by S the set of all policies of player MIN. Similarly, a policy of MAX is a map:
Note that since the game is in perfect information, MAX observes the action a of MIN, and so the policy of player MAX takes care of this action. We denote by T the set of all policies of player MAX. It is known that in the discounted game, there exist optimal strategies associated to policies (the action is selected at each step by applying a policy of one player, the policy being the same for all time steps). These policies are obtained by selecting actions achieving the minimum and the maximum in the expression of T (v) in Def. 1. See [2] .
Any choice of policies (σ, τ ) ∈ S × T defines the Markovian matrix P στ ∈ R n×n which determines the state trajectory if the two players select their actions according to these policies. i.e., (P στ ) ij = P
. We denote the cardinality of a finite set S by |S|. We recall that the size of the input is of order |S E|.
B. Mean payoff problem
We are now interested in the undiscounted case, in which the discount factor γ is identically 1. Then we are considering a two-player perfect information zero-sum Stochastic Mean-Payoff Game (MPSG), where the main quantity of interest is the mean payoff vector:
The entry χ i (T ) represents the mean payoff per time unit, if the initial state is i. Here, the mean payoff is defined by considering a family of games in finite horizon k as k tends to infinity. There are alternative approaches, in which the mean payoff is defined as the value of an infinite horizon game [11] . The property of the uniform value established in [9] entails that the different natural approaches lead to the same notion of mean payoff.
The analysis of the mean payoff problem is simplified when the following non-linear eigenproblem has a solution:
where e := (1 · · · 1) ∈ R n is the unit vector. The scalar η is called the ergodic constant, whereas the vector v, which is not unique, is called bias or potential. When this equation is solvable, we have χ(T ) = ηe, i.e., the mean payoff is independent of the initial state, and it is equal to the ergodic constant. See e.g. [12] for background.
III. REDUCTION FROM A MEAN PAYOFF PROBLEM TO A DISCOUNTED ONE
Let u ∈ R n , we write u 0 and we say that u is a positive vector if for all i ∈ [n] := {1, · · · , n}, u i > 0. Given u 0, we define the weighted sup norm · u by :
A. Contraction rate of Shapley operators
We next introduce a notion of recession function associated to a non-linear map. Our definition is inspired by the notion of Clarke generalized directional derivative [13, Ch. 2, S1] of a function f at point z in the direction y
We next adapt this idea by considering "variations at infinity" instead of local variations.
We chose the name "Clarke recession function" in view of the similarity between (6) and (5) .
The following result is immediate:
The Clarke recession function is positively homogeneous and convex.
Theorem 1. Let f : R n → R n be a monotone function, u 0 be a positive vector, and λ ∈ R + . We havef (u) λu if and only if the function f is λ-contracting in the weighted sup-norm · u :
Following [4, 14] , we define the Collatz-Wielandt number off as
As an immediate consequence of Thm. 1, we get:
We consider the Shapley operator T : R n → R n of Def. 1. The following "max-max" operator T max : R n → R n was considered in [4] T max i (y) = max a∈Ai,b∈Bi,a {M ab i y} , ∀i ∈ S, y ∈ R n . (7) In contrast to the Clarke recession functionT , T max generally depends on the choice of the representation of T as a minimax expression. We next show, however, that T max =T if all the terms arising in the minimax expression are "useful" in the following sense.
Definition 3. For a given couple of actions (a, b) of the two players, we define the set
In the one player case, checking whether one action is useful reduces to checking whether a polyhedron has a nonempty interior, and this can be done in polynomial time.
Lemma 1. The Clarke recession function of the Shapley operator T satisfies the following inequality:
Moreover, the equality holds if all the actions (a, b) are useful.
There is an explicit formula for the Collatz-Wielandt number of T max . Recall that the notation M στ refers to the nonnegative matrix associated to a pair of policies (end of Section II-A). We denote by ρ(·) the spectral radius of a matrix.
Theorem 2 (Corollary of [15] ). We have
Owing to Thm. 1 and Lemma 1, we will look for a vector ϕ 0 such that T max (ϕ) λϕ for some λ ∈ [0, 1), to have that the Shapley operator T is λ−contracting in the weighted norm · ϕ . The following special construction allows us to obtain such a ϕ by solving a non-linear eigenproblem.
Theorem 3 (Th. 7 and proof of Th. 13 in [4] ). The following assertions are equivalent:
2) there exists a unique vector ϕ ∈ R n + such that ϕ = e + T max (ϕ). When these assumptions are satisfied, T is λ-contracting in the weighted norm · ϕ , with λ :
Correspondence between ergodic problems and discounted problems via the h-transform
We consider here the non-linear eigenproblem (4), where T is the Shapley operator in the undiscounted case, and describe a technique introduced in [4] to reduce this equation to a fixed point equation of a contracting operator. Recall that (4) allows one to solve the mean-payoff problem. As noted above, the vector v solution of (4) is not unique. In particular, if v is a solution then v +αe also yields a solution for all α ∈ R. Hence, we shall distinguish a special state c ∈ S and require v c = 0.
Definition 4. For a Markov matrix P and states i, j, we denote:
the expected first hitting time of state j, for a Markov chain X k with transition matrix P and initial state i.
Given c ∈ S, it is easy to see that T ic (P ) < +∞ for all i ∈ S if and only if P has a unique final (recurrent) class and that c belongs to this class. A state c with the latter property is called a renewal state.
Definition 5. For any matrix P ∈ R n×n , we denote by P (c) ∈ R n×n the matrix obtained from P by replacing the column c of P with zeros. We denote by P i the ith row of P , so that P i = (P ij ) j∈[n] , and we use a similar notation for matrices constructed from P , e.g.,
Lemma 2. Let c ∈ S be a given state. The following assertions are equivalent:
1) For all (σ, τ ) ∈ S × T , P στ has a unique final class, and the state c is common to each of these classes;
There is a unique vector ϕ solution of the equation:
Under these assumptions, we have ϕ i = T ic , for all i ∈ S.
In the rest of this section, we make the following assumption. Assumption 1. There exists a state c ∈ S satisfying the conditions of Lemma 2.
We can find such a state c if it exists, or certify that there is none, in quasi-linear time by using directed hypergraphs techniques, along the lines of [16] ; details will be given elsewhere.
Let ϕ ∈ R n + , ϕ 0, and R n c := {x ∈ R n | x c = 0}. Definition 6. For a nonnegative matrix P ∈ R n×n , if ϕ i 1+P (c)i ϕ, ∀i ∈ S, then we denote by P (c,ϕ) the nonnegative matrix obtained from P by replacing the column c by the vector ϕ −1
Definition 7. For any self-map f of R n , we denote by L ϕ (f ) the self-map of R n , such that for all w, v ∈ R n and η ∈ R with v c = 0 and w = η + ϕ −1 v, we have
Remark 1. For a matrix P we have by Lemma 3 L ϕ (P )(w) = P ϕ w where P ϕ ∈ R n×n is the nonnegative matrix given by P ϕ,ij := ϕ −1 i P (c,ϕ)ij ϕ j , (i, j) ∈ S 2 , so that
We consider the Shapley operator in the undiscounted case T i (v) = min a∈Ai max b∈Bi,a r ab i + P ab i v , ∀i ∈ S, ∀v ∈ R n . (10) By Lemma 2, we know that there exists a vector ϕ ∈ R n + , such that
So we can define as above a monotone operator T ϕ := L ϕ (T ), and we verify easily that
Lemma 4. If there exists a vector ϕ ∈ R n + such that ϕ i 1 + max a,b [P ab (c)i ϕ] for all i ∈ S, then T ϕ is λ ϕ −contracting in the sup-norm · ∞ , with λ ϕ := 1 − 1/ ϕ ∞ . T ϕ can be interpreted as a Shapley operator of a discounted game with discount factors λ ϕ .
Remark 2. The vector ϕ defined by (9) is solution of a fixed point equation of the form ϕ = F (ϕ ) where the map F is order preserving and contracting in the norm 
where η ∈ R and v ∈ R n with v c = 0, can be reduced to the fixed point problem:
where w ∈ R n such that w = η + ϕ −1 v. Equation (14) has a unique solution w .
We verify easily that for w ∈ R n , and i ∈ S we have
Lemma 5. The solution w of equation (14) satisfies w ∞ R.
Example 1. We give an elementary illustration of the present deflation+h-transform technique. Let P = ( 0 1 1 0 ), r ∈ R 2 , and consider T (x) = r + P x. Let us choose c = 1. The first hitting time vector ϕ is such that ϕ 2 = 1 and ϕ 1 = 1 + ϕ 2 = 2, so ϕ ∞ = 2. The operator T ϕ given by (15) specializes to T ϕ (w 1 , w 2 ) = ( r1 2 + w2 2 , r 2 ). In accordance with Lemma 4, this operator is 1/2−contracting. The unique fixed point of T ϕ is w = ((r 1 + r 2 )/2, r 2 ) = ηe + ϕ −1 v, from which, by Thm. 4, we recover the mean payoff η = (r 1 + r 2 )/2, and v = (0, (r 2 − r 1 )/2).
IV. VARIANCE REDUCED VALUE ITERATION FOR
STRUCTURED STOCHASTIC GAMES
To solve the non-linear eigenproblem (13), we will find a vector ϕ satisfying (11) by solving (9) in an approximate way, and then use ϕ to define the new operator (12) and solve the discounted problem (14) . We next present a variant of the method of Sidford et al. [3] to deal with a structured input, which will allow us to handle both problems (9) and (14) .
We consider a perfect information two-player zero-sum stochastic game with general discount (SG) as described in sec. II, except that we suppose that P στ is a sub-Markovian matrix for each couple of policies (σ, τ ) ∈ S × T . We suppose the associated Shapley operator can be written as
Here L ∈ R n×n is a sparse operator such that for all w ∈ R n , Lw can be computed in O(|S|). For all i ∈ S, a ∈ A i , b ∈ B i,a , G ab i is a sparse affine operator such that G ab i (w) can be computed in O(1) for all w ∈ R n . For example, by taking L = Id and G ab i (w) = r ab i , ∀w ∈ R n we obtain the Shapley operator of the stochastic game with general discount. The operator L will allow us to handle the deflation (pre-subtraction of w c e) in Eq. (15) .
The problem that we want to solve is:
In this section, we make the following assumption: We can easily show the following inequalities:
Remark 3. In the following, the values ψ −1 ∞ and ψ ∞ can be replaced by any positive scalars d 1 , d 2 > 0 such that
We denote also by · ∞ the operator norm associated to the sup-norm, so that we have:
To a given vector p = (p j ) j∈S with p j 0, ∀j ∈ S and j∈S p j 1, we associate the probability vectorp = (p j ) j∈S∪{0} withp j = p j , ∀j ∈ S andp 0 = 1 − j∈S p j .
For each i ∈ S, a ∈ A i , b ∈ B i,a , we suppose that we can sample under the probabilityP ab i associated to the vector P ab i in time O(1). We next adapt the algorithms 1 − 6 presented by Sidford et al. in [3] to our case with two players. We follow the presentation of [3] , including the decomposition of the algorithm in elementary subroutines. The necessary changes arise from the use of the weighted sup-norm · ψ instead of · ∞ , from the sub-Markovian character of the matrices.
In the following, Algorithm 1 computes an approximation of P ab i u by sampling under the probability vectorP ab i . Algorithm 2 computes an approximation of T (w) for w ∈ R n , given an initial vector w 0 ∈ R n . This algorithm assumes that an approximation of the terms x ab i = P ab i Lw 0 , called offsets in [3] , is already known. Then, Algorithm 3 implements a randomized value iteration, using Algorithm 2 at each iteration. To initialize Algorithm 3, the offsets x ab i = P ab i Lw 0 are computed exactly. Algorithm 4 iterates Algorithm 3, using the technique of variance reduction by dividing the error by 2 at every iteration. Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 are similar to Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4, with the difference that the offsets are sampled, instead of being computed exactly. Input: Target accuracy > 0, failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1) Input: Current vector w ∈ R n and initial vector w0 ∈ R n .
2:
Input: Precomputed offsets: x ∈ R E with |x ab i − P ab i Lw0| for all i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi,a.
3:
Input: Target accuracy > 0, failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1)
for a ∈ Ai do 8: for b ∈ Bi,a do Input: initial vector w0 ∈ R n , number of iterations J > 0 2:
Input: Target accuracy > 0, failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1) 3: Compute x ∈ R E such that x ab i = P ab i Lw0 for all i ∈ S and a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi,a. 4: for j ∈ [J] do (wj, σj, τj) = SApxVal(wj−1, w0, x, , δ J ) 5: done 6: return (wJ , σJ , τJ ) Algorithm 4 Structured high precision randomized value iteration: SHighPrecisionRandVI( , δ, λ, W, Γ, ψ −1 ∞ , ψ ∞ )
1:
Input: Target accuracy > 0, failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1) 2: Let K = log 2 ( ψ ∞W ) and J = 1 1−λ log(4) 3: w0 = 0 and 0 = W 4: for k ∈ [K] do 5:
Algorithm 5 Structured sampled randomized value iteration: SSampledRandVI(w 0 , J, , δ)
Input: initial vector w0 ∈ R n , number of iterations J > 0 2:
Input: Target accuracy > 0, failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1) 3: Sample to obtain approximate offsets:x ∈ R E such that with probability 1 − δ 2 , |x ab i − P ab i Lw0| for all i ∈ S and a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi,a: 
Lemma 9 (adaptation of Lem. 4.5 in [3] ). The sequence (w j ) j∈[J] generated by Algorithm 3 satisfies with probability 1 − δ, that for all j ∈ [J]:
Lemma 10 (adaptation of Lem. 4.6 in [3] ). Algorithm 3 runs in time Input: Target accuracy > 0, failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1) 2: Let K = log 2 ( ψ ∞W ) and J = 1 1−λ log(4) 3: w0 = 0 and 0 = W 4: for k ∈ [K] do 5:
and then w K − w ∞ , and runs in time 1 :
Lemma 12 (adaptation of Lem. 4.10 and Lem. 4.12 in [3] ). Algorithm 6 gives with probability 1 − δ that w k − w ψ k for all k ∈ [0, K], in particular w K − w ψ ψ ∞ and then w K − w ∞ , and runs in timẽ
V. VARIANCE REDUCED DEFLATED VALUE ITERATION FOR ERGODIC PROBLEMS
To solve the mean-payoff problem of sec. II-B, we consider the equation:
where T is as in Def. 1: T i (v) = min a∈Ai max b∈Bi,a r ab i + j∈S P ab ij v j , ∀i ∈ S. Throughout the section, we make Assumption 1. We denote by (η , v ) the unique solution of this problem. We know by Lemma 2 that there exists a vector ϕ ∈ R n + satisfying (11) . Thm. 4 shows that (18) is equivalent to the equation:
with η = w c , v = ϕ(w − w c ), and T ϕ is given by (15) .
A. Computing an h-transform of the ergodic problem
Here we want to find a vector ϕ ∈ R n + satisfying (11) . First, we consider the problem of finding the vector of maximal expected first hitting times of state c, denoted ϕ as in (9) , and we suppose that we know a bound H on it:
We define the scalar λ ∈ [0, 1) by
We remark that the component ϕ c can be computed in time O(|E|) from the other components since ϕ c = 1 + max a∈Ai,b∈Bi,a [ j∈S,j =c P ab ij ϕ j ]. We define w = 1 As in [3] we useÕ to hide polylogarithmic factors in the input parameters, i.e.Õ(f (x)) = O(f (x) log(f (x)) O(1) ).
(ϕ i ) i∈S\{c} ∈ R n−1 and we remove the c row and the c column from the matrices P στ to obtain the matrices P στ ∈ R (n−1)×(n−1) , so that the problem becomes
where the operator T m is such that
The operator T m is a particular case of the operator T in (17): for (σ, τ ) ∈ S × T , P στ =P στ are sub-Markovian. For (i, a, b) ∈ E, γ ab i = 1 and then Γ = 1, G ab i (w) = 1 for all w ∈ R n−1 and L is the identity then L ∞ = 1.
From Thm. 3 and Eq. (21), we know that the operator T m is µ−contracting in the sup-norm · w , with µ : ) .
B. Solving the ergodic problem
We suppose that we have identified a vector ϕ satisfying (11). Now we consider the equation (19).
As in sec. IV, we can write T ϕ in the general form given by Eq. (16), where γ ab
is a sparse linear operator and we have L ∞ 2 ϕ ∞ = 2 1−λϕ and G ab i :
By Lemma 4, T ϕ is a λ ϕ −contraction in the sup-norm · ∞ , where λ ϕ = 1 − 1/ ϕ ∞ . We take here ψ = e, which means · ψ = · ∞ and ψ −1 ∞ = ψ ∞ = 1. By Lemma 5, we have w ∞ R, where w is the solution of Eq. (19). So we take W = R.
The following theorems give an approximation for w and then also for v and η in nearly linear time with Thm. 7 (based on Thm. 5 and Lemma 11), and in sublinear time with Thm. 8 (based on Thm. 6 and Lemma 12). The time complexities considered include the times needed to find ϕ. 
Theorem 8. With probability 1 − δ, we find ϕ satisfying (11) and the call of Algorithm 6, SSublinearRandVI( , δ 2 , λ ϕ , R, 1, 1, 1) returns w ∈ R n such that w − w ∞ . Therefore we obtain η = w c and v = ϕ(w − w c e) such that |η − η | and v − v ∞ ) .
VI. COMPARISON WITH ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
A. A cyclic example: no contraction or mixing
The convergence proof of the sampled relative value iteration in [7] requires the Dobrushin ergodicity coefficient 
to be smaller than 1. Consider the 0-player instance with a cyclic matrix P , presented in Ex. 1. Here, α = 1, and actually, relative value iteration does not converge. Moreover, the mixing time used in the bound of [8] is infinite. However, as shown in Ex. 1, the deflation+h-transform methods reduces to a fixed point problem with a contraction rate of 1/2.
B. An example with small hitting times
Let us first consider a 0−player problem with state space [n], T (v) = r + Qv, ∀v ∈ R n , where r ∈ R n fixed and the probability transition matrix Q ∈ R n×n , such that Q i,1 = Q i,i+1 = 1/2, i ∈ [n − 1], Q n,1 = 1 .
We can easily prove that the expected first return time to state n is T cc = Ω(2 n ). If we denote by ν the stationary distribution of Q, it follows that ν n = O(2 −n ). In [8] , one supposes the stationary distribution of Q satisfies 1 √ τ n e ν √ τ n e, so, τ = Ω(2 2n /n 2 ). The complexity bound of [8] is exponential in this example, since it includes a τ 2 factor. By using our technique, we will first choose c = 1 and we verify easily that the first hitting time vector ϕ satisfies ϕ ∞ 2 (more precisely ϕ i = 2 − 1 2 n−i , ∀i ∈ [n]). Then the new operator T ϕ is 1/2−contracting which leads to fast convergence. In particular, Thm. 7 gives a time complexitỹ O(n 2 log( R ) log( 1 δ )), and Thm. 8 gives a time complexitỹ O(n R 2 2 log( 1 δ )), where R is an upper bound on the payments, is the target accuracy and δ is the failure probability. In this 0-player example, α = 1/2, so we could use relative value iteration. This is no longer the case if we consider the following 1-player variant. By identifying n + 1 and 1, consider the stochastic matrix Q i+1,2 = Q i+1,i+2 = 1 2 , i ∈ [n − 1], Q 1,2 = 1 .
let r ∈ R n be a vector of payments, and consider the Bellman operator T (x) = max(r + Qx, r + Q x), so that there are two actions in every state. Now, α = 1 and the convergence of the relative value iteration [7] is not guaranteed. However, we observe that for all policies, the probability to reach the set of states {1, 2} in one step is at least 1/2. Moreover, for all actions, the probability of the transition 1 → 2 is at least 1/2. It follows that by choosing c = 2, the vector of maximal hitting times ϕ satisfies ϕ ∞ 4 (more precisely ϕ 1 = 2 and ϕ i = 4− 1 2 n−i , ∀i ∈ {2, · · · , n}). Hence, the deflation+h-transform method still has a sublinear behavior on this example.
